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The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
and its Progress in the States
By David M. English
ver the past decade, planning
for health care decision making
through the making of an ad-
vance directive has become a routine
part of personal counseling. Public
interest in the subject has been fueled
by well-publicized cases such as
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In re-
sponse to this interest, most states
authorize their citizens to make at
least one form of advance directive:
all states statutorily authorize powers
of attorney for health care, and all but
Massachusetts, Michigan and New
York authorize living wills.
State legislation has been a mixed
blessing. Although intended to facili-
tate the making of advance directives,
many of the statutes may actually in-
hibit their use. The execution require-
ments are often detailed. Restrictions
on the types of treatment that may be
withheld or withdrawn are common.
There is little uniformity. The result
is a system of fragmented, incomplete
and often inconsistent legislation, both
among states and within single states.
In 1993, the Uniform Law Commis-
sioners approved the Uniform Health-
Care Decisions Act (UHCDA) in order
to bring order to the existing chaos.
(The text of the UHCDA is available
at www.nccusl.org.) Unfortunately,
the Commissioners waited too long
to act. By the time the UHCDA was
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approved, nearly all states had passed
legislation governing advance direc-
tives. Convincing states to revisit
existing legislation is not easy. Interest
declines in expending further political
capital on what may seem to some
to be only modest improvements.
Consequently, the UHCDA has
achieved only a limited success,
picking up but one or two enactments
a year. The UHCDA is currently in
effect in six states: California, Cal.
Prob. Code §§ 4600-4805; Delaware,
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2517;
Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 327E-1 to
327E-16; Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18-A, §§ 5-801 to 5-817; Mississippi,
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-41-201 to 41-41-
229; and New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 24-7A-1 to 24-7A-18.
The overall objective of the
UHCDA is to encourage the making
and enforcement of advance health
care directives and to provide a
means for making health care deci-
sions for those who have failed to
plan. The UHCDA accomplishes
these objectives by
e making the UHCDA comprehen-
sive, combining in one place topics
that are related but that have often
been addressed by separate statutes;
• removing the hurdles to the
making of advance directives and the
limitations on the topics an advance
directive can address;
e establishing a system for deci-
sion making by surrogates for those
who have failed to plan; and
- providing a mechanism for the
enforcement of advance directives.
Comprehensive Scope
Most states recognize living wills,
powers of attorney for health care
and a decision making role for the
families of those who have failed to
make advance directives. But the
statutes that address these subjects
often create inconsistencies within a
state's own law. The UHCDA avoids
these inconsistencies by covering
all of these topics within one statute.
Under the UHCDA, any adult or
emancipated minor may give an
"advance health-care directive," which
refers to either a "power of attorney
for health care" or "individual instruc-
tion." The UHCDA deliberately avoids
the term "living will," because the
drafters concluded that the term "indi-
vidual instruction" is more accurate. If
an individual fails to execute a power
of attorney for health care or if the
agent is not available, the UHCDA
authorizes health care decisions to be
made by a "surrogate" to be selected
from a priority list.
All six states that have enacted
the UHCDA include its provisions
on individual instructions and powers
of attorney, albeit with numerous
(mostly small) modifications. All of
these states, except California, contain




UHCDA does not address all conceiv-
able issues. The UHCDA is limited to
health care decision making for adults
and emancipated minors. The Com-
missioners concluded that covering
the full range of health care decision
making for unemancipated minors,
including the effect of differing
parental and custodial arrangements
and levels of maturity would have
made the Act unwieldy
A topic generating enormous
publicity in recent years is physician-
assisted suicide. The UHCDA does
not expressly prohibit physician-
assisted suicide, but it does recognize
that other state statutes may prohibit
the practice. The consensus to date is
that physician-assisted suicide, if it
is to be allowed at all, requires the
enactment of special legislation, such
as that in effect in Oregon. Or. Rev.
Stat. §§ 127.800 to 127.995.
A topic not generating as much
discussion but ultimately far more
important is the problem of the
"friendless patient"-the individual
who has no family or friends avail-
able to act on his or her behalf. The
UHCDA does not address this topic,
nor is it adequately addressed in any
of the states that have enacted the
UHCDA. This leaves the decisions
for friendless patients to be made
largely in default by health care
providers without any guidance or
safeguards. A need remains for a pro-
cedure to make routine and critical
health care decisions for friendless
patients outside of court but with
appropriate safeguards.
Eliminating Restrictions
Most power of attorney for health
care statutes allow a principal to dele-
gate to an agent the authority to make
all health care decisions. The living
will statutes are replete with restric-
tions. The complex definitions of the
categories of patients for whom life-
sustaining treatment may be withheld
or withdrawn and the prohibitions
against the withdrawing or withhold-
ing of certain forms of treatment
have rendered many of these statutes
virtual nullities.
The drafters of the UHCDA con-
cluded that the attempts to prescribe
statutorily the circumstances when life-
sustaining treatment may be withheld
or withdrawn are difficult to apply
in a clinical setting and provide an
appearance of precision where none
is possible. Under the UHCDA, there
are no specific restrictions. An individ-
ual instruction and the authority
granted to an agent may extend to
any "health-care decision," a term that
is expansively defined to include such
matters as approval or disapproval of
orders not to resuscitate and directions
to provide, withhold or withdraw
artificial nutrition and hydration and
other forms of health care.
The enacting states are mostly
faithful to the text of the UHCDA on
this point. Only Delaware restricts
the topics that can be addressed in
an advance health care directive, pro-
viding that an advance health care
directive can be applied to withdraw
life-sustaining procedures only for
patients who are terminally ill or
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permanently unconscious. Both Dela-
ware and Maine allow a surrogate to
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining
treatment, but only from patients
who are terminally ill or permanently
unconscious. Hawaii prohibits a
surrogate from withdrawing or
withholding artificial nutrition and
hydration without certification by
two physicians that treatment is
merely prolonging the act of dying
and that the patient is unlikely to
have any neurological response.
Execution Requirements
The execution requirements for
an advance directive in many states
are both cumbersome and confusing.
Most living will statutes require two
witnesses. Some require only the prin-
cipal's signature. Other statutes follow
the living will model and require
two witnesses. Some statutes require
the power to be either witnessed
or acknowledged at the principal's
option; others require it to be both
witnessed and acknowledged. Most
living will and power of attorney
for health care statutes also impose
witness qualification rules, some of
which are quite lengthy
The drafters of the UHCDA con-
cluded that the cumbersome execution
requirements found in many state
statutes have done little to deter
fraud or overreaching. Instead, their
primary effect is to deter the making
of advance directives and to invalidate
defectively executed directives that
otherwise would be reliable indica-
tors of the individual's intent. The
UHCDA facilitates the making of
advance directives by keeping exe-
cution requirements to an absolute
minimum. A power of attorney
for health care must be written and
signed, but it need not be either
witnessed or acknowledged. An indi-
vidual instruction may be either
written or oral.
This attempt to eliminate execution
requirements has been only a partial
success. Concerns about possible fraud
and undue influence motivated many
state legislatures in their consideration
of the UHCDA. Nevertheless, the
UHCDA's provisions on oral instruc-
tions have been generally accepted,
although both Maine and New Mexico
have imposed some safeguards.
Maine provides that the instruction
is valid only if given to the health care
provider or person eligible to act as
surrogate; New Mexico validates
an instruction only if given to the
health care provider. Only Delaware
omits the provision recognizing
oral instructions.
The effort to relax execution re-
quirements for the power of attorney
for health care has been less successful.
Only New Mexico has followed the
UHCDA without change. The other
states have generally retained the exe-
cution requirements under prior law.
But even here surface appearances do
not reflect the full reality. Most of the
states have enacted without change
the UHCDA provision on oral designa-
tions of surrogates, which in practical
effect is the same as allowing for the
oral appointments of agents.
The Statutory Form
Statutory forms provide a number
of benefits. Because the form is stan-
dard and widely available, individuals
who would otherwise be reluctant to
pay to have a form prepared are more
likely to execute an advance directive.
The availability of an officially sanc-
tioned form will reduce the reluctance
of health care providers to honor a
directive. Through continued use of
the form, it is hoped that health care
providers will become more familiar
with its provisions and make more
informed decisions.
Nearly all living will statutes con-
tain statutory forms, as do most of
the power of attorney for health care
enactments. Signing separate power
of attorney and living will forms
can lead to complications: execution
requirements may differ, and forms
can be inconsistent. Issues can arise
as to how to coordinate the two docu-
ments. Did the creator intend the agent
to be bound by the wishes expressed
in the living will, or did the creator
instead intend that the living will
apply only if the agent is unavailable?
These problems can be avoided or at
least significantly reduced if an indi-
vidual signs one combined advanced
directive form that addresses in one
place both the designation of an agent
and the giving of instructions.
The UHCDA's combined advance
directives form consists of four parts:
appointment of agent, instructions,
organ and tissue donation and desig-
nation of primary physician. The
power of attorney appears first on
the form to ensure that it comes to
the attention of the casual reader, since
the appointment of an agent is usually
more helpful in the making of health
care decisions than is the giving of
specific instructions. Because the vari-
ety of potential treatment decisions
is virtually unlimited, the instructions
part of the form addresses only those
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'The drafters of the UHCDA concluded
that the cumbersome execution
requirements found in many state
statutes have done little to deter
fraud or overreaching.
categories of care for which an in-
dividual is most likely to have special
wishes. This section includes optional
provisions relating to withdrawing
or withholding treatment, supplying
artificial nutrition and hydration and
providing pain relief. An individual
may merely designate an agent and
leave the instructions part of the form
blank. This allows the agent maximum
flexibility to respond to the principal's
current health care needs.
Adopting language suggested
by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
the form includes space for the indi-
vidual to express an intent to make an
organ or tissue donation. The drafting
committee assumed that a donation
designation on an advance health care
directive is more likely to come to light
than an organ donor card. Because
health care providers usually refuse
to honor a donation document un-
less the donor's family concurs, practi-
tioners should always encourage
donors to discuss their wishes with
their families.
Finally, the form provides space
for an individual to designate a
"primary" physician. The UHCDA
specifically avoids use of the term
"attending physician," which could
refer to the physician currently pro-
viding treatment to the individual
and not the physician whom the
individual would select. Among
the functions of a patient's primary
physician is the determination of
the patient's capacity to make health
care decisions.
Drafting forms is an art, not a sci-
ence, and there is always room for
improvement. In many small ways,
New Mexico's form is more "user
friendly" than the UHCDA form.
The other states have largely enacted
the form without significant change,
except for conforming the form to
match other modifications that they
have made to the UHCDA, such as
the addition of execution requirements.
Perhaps from a concern that providing
for organ and tissue donation might
deter some individuals from making
advance directives, both Mississippi
and New Mexico dropped the subject
from their forms, although New
Mexico later added it back.
Surrogates
Despite the wider and highly rec-
ommended use of powers of attorney
for health care, families continue
to play an important role in making
health care decisions for incapacitated
relatives. Very few individuals make
advance directives. For the majority
who never make a directive, recourse
to the family may be the only realistic
method for assuring continuity in
decision making. The appointment of
a guardian is expensive, cumbersome
and often ill-suited to the making of
health care decisions, particularly
when time may be of the essence.
Health care providers' reliance on
the family is often based on little more
than medical custom, but about two-
thirds of the states have legislation in
force validating a decision making role
for the family. Most of these statutes
create a priority list based on closeness
of relationship to the patient. Some pri-
ority lists are rather rigid, but others
allow the decision to be made by some-
one lower on the list who might be
better qualified. The approach of the
UHCDA is not necessarily the last
word. Undoubtedly, new and perhaps
better methods of making health care
decisions for those who have failed to
plan will arise. The UHCDA empowers
a surrogate to make a health care deci-
sion for an adult or emancipated minor
for whom no agent or guardian has
been appointed or whose agent or
guardian is not reasonably available.
A surrogate may act even if the patient
has provided written instructions.
Instructions rarely address all health
care decisions that need to be made.
Even if they do, interpretation is
often necessary.
The UHCDA's initial priority list
is rather standard, beginning with the
spouse, followed in order by an adult
child, a parent and an adult sibling.
Those lower on the list are eligible to
act when a predecessor is unwilling
to decide or is unavailable. Unlike the
statutes in most states, the UHCDA
then creates a bottom level priority
for the "close friend," although distant
relatives and domestic partners can
also fit within this category. The
UHCDA defines a "close friend" as
a person who has exhibited special
care and concern for the patient and
who is familiar with the patient's
personal values.
The states enacting the UHCDA
have not hesitated to modify the
priority list. Delaware expressly dis-
qualifies the spouse if there has been
a complaint of domestic abuse. Hawaii
rejects the priority list altogether, opt-
ing instead to select the surrogate
based on the consensus of the inter-
ested persons, who are defined to
include all of the persons who might
have been eligible to act as surrogate
under the UHCDA as originally
written. Maine and New Mexico
add various other relatives to the
list. More significantly, New Mexico
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"Despite the wider and highly recom-
mended use of powers of attorney for
health care, families continue to play an
important role in making health care
decisions for incapacitated relatives.
also creates an express priority for a
domestic partner.
Orally Designated Surrogates
The UHCDA does not specifically
use the term "domestic partner," but
an attempt to address issues arising
from such relationships led to perhaps
the most innovative and successful
feature of the Uniform Act. Instead of
granting domestic partners a specific
priority, the Commissioners elected to
make it easier for any patient to desig-
nate a nonrelative to make health care
decisions. The "orally designated
surrogate" appears as the type of deci-
sion maker first on the priority list of
surrogates. The orally designated sur-
rogate does not have quite the status
of an agent appointed under a written
power of attorney; hence the use of
the different term. Although the Com-
missioners by the use of this term
indicated a preference for written
powers of attorney, they also recog-
nized that many individuals simply
will fail to prepare the necessary
documents. Furthermore, the Com-
missioners recognized that oral
designations occur with some fre-
quency in practice. The ease with
which oral designations can be made
creates a significant risk of miscom-
munication, however. To provide
some reliability of proof, an individual
may orally designate a surrogate only
by personally informing the individ-
ual's supervising health care provider.
In turn, the UHCDA obligates the
health care provider to record the
designation in the individual's health
care record.
All of the states that have enacted
the UHCDA included the oral surro-
gacy provision. It is the most success-
ful of the UHCDA's innovations. Only
Delaware has made the making of an
appointment more difficult by requir-
ing that the patient's oral designation
be communicated not only to the
supervising health care provider but
also to a witness who is someone
other than the designated surrogate.
California added language to clarify
that an oral designation of a surrogate
continues only during the course of
treatment or illness or stay in the
health care institution.
Enforcement
Effectuating a patient's right to
self-determination requires assurance
that the patient's views and the deci-
sions of those acting for the patient
will be respected and enforced.
The UHCDA contains a series of pro-
visions designed to enhance this
possibility. The UHCDA requires
providers to honor a patient's instruc-
tions about health care and to comply
with a reasonable interpretation of
those instructions and with a health
care decision made by the patient's
agent, guardian or surrogate. A health
care provider may decline to act only
for "reasons of conscience" or if the
requested treatment would be "med-
ically ineffective." In either case, a
health care provider or institution
must assist in the patient's transfer
to another health care provider or
facility where compliance will be
assured, if one can be found.
The UHCDA provides certain
immunities to induce compliance.
An individual's agent or surrogate is
typically an uncompensated volunteer
and therefore is not held to the onerous
standards of general fiduciary law. An
individual acting as a patient's agent
or surrogate is not subject to civil or
criminal liability for health care deci-
sions made in good faith. To encourage
health care providers to comply, the
UHCDA generally exempts from lia-
bility health care providers acting in
good faith and in accordance with
generally accepted health care stan-
dards. The UHCDA protects providers
who (1) comply with a health care
decision of a person apparently having
authority to make a decision for a
patient, (2) decline to comply with the
decision of a person based on a belief
that the person lacks authority, and
(3) assume that the directive was valid
when made and has not been revoked
or terminated.
The provisions of the UHCDA
on enforcement of advance directives
have been enacted without significant
changes. The most important revisions
concern the obligation to provide
continuing care upon declination of
a health care decision for reasons of
conscience or on the basis that the care
would be medically ineffective. Recog-
nizing that no other facility may be
willing to accept the patient, California
has specified that the obligation of the
declining facility to provide continuing
care does not mean unlimited compli-
ance with the patient request but only
that the facility continue pain relief and
other palliative care. Maine provides
that the obligation to provide continu-
ing care terminates on final order of
court regarding the disputed health
care decision. California, Delaware
and New Mexico fix a gap in the im-
munities section of the UHCDA by
providing protection from liability
to a provider or institution declining to
provide care as authorized by the Act.
Conclusion
The Uniform Health-Care Deci-
sions Act represents a major advance
over the existing law in most states. It
is comprehensive; it facilitates the giv-
ing of advance health care directives;
it addresses decision making for those
who have failed to plan; and it elimi-
nates many restrictions. The six en-
actments to date, even with all of the
local modifications, remain relatively
faithful to the Act's fundamental
premises. In the politically charged
arena of health care decision making
at the end of life, achieving uniformity
in all of the details is not possible.
Achieving agreement on fundamental
goals is more than sufficient.
David M. English, who was the
Reporter for the Uniform Health-Care
Decisions Act, is the WE Fratcher
Missouri Endowed Professor of
Law at the University of Missouri-







Based on the success of
National Health Care Decisions
Week 2000, HRSA has extended
grant support for National
Health Care Decisions Week
2001 (October 21-27, 2001). Sec-
tion members are encouraged
to contact their state and local
bar associations to participate
in this year's initiative. For more
information, contact Maria Tabor,




Keeping Current-Probate offers a look at selected
recent cases, rulings and regulations, literature and
legislation. The editors of Probate & Property welcome
suggestions and contributions from readers.
* ADOPTION: Trust beneficiary has standing to chal-
lenge adult adoption. An uncle adopted his life partner.
By the adoption, the adoptee became the remainder
beneficiary of a trust that would otherwise have passed
to the uncle's niece when the uncle died. In Rickard v.
McKesson, 774 So.2d 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), the
court held that the niece would have had the right to
challenge the adoption had she received notice. The lack
of notice amounted to fraud on the court. Accordingly,
her action was not barred by the statute of limitations
on reopening judgments.
* BENEFICIARY: Statute voiding gift to beneficiary
who transcribes will narrowly construed. California
law invalidates any donative transfer to a "person who
has a fiduciary relationship to the transferor" and "who
transcribes [the donative instrument] or causes it to be
transcribed." Cal. Prob. Code § 21350. In Estate of Swet-
mann, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), the court
held that the statute applies only to a beneficiary who
causes the instrument to be written out in final form and
is thus in a position to subvert the donor's intent.
* CLASS GIFT: Gift over on death to children prevents
vesting. A decedent left his wife a life estate in the residue
of his estate, the remainder to his brothers and sisters and,
if any of his siblings predeceased the life tenant, that sib-
ling's share would pass to the sibling's children. A brother
predeceased the life tenant but was not survived by chil-
dren. The court in Martino v. Martino, 35 SW. 3d 252 (Tex.
App. 2000), held that the language creating a gift over
prevented absolute vesting of the remainder and thus the
brother lost his share of the remainder.
* DISCLAIMERS: Disclaimer may not be rescinded or
reformed. A son disclaimed his interest in his mother's
estate, assuming it would pass to his brother, the other
residuary legatee named in the will. Instead, by virtue of
the applicable statute providing that a disclaimant is
treated as predeceasing the decedent, the son's interest
passed to his minor children. In Estate of Fleenor, 17 P. 3d
520 (Or. Ct. App. 2000), the court held that the statutory
provision making disclaimers irrevocable prevented
the son's attempt to undo his disclaimer and that the
disclaimer could not be reformed into a conveyance to
his brother.
9 FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS: Transfer of assets
to an FLP did not constitute a taxable gift. The court in
Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No. 35 (2000),
held that there was no gift when the FLP was formed
despite a valuation discount causing the partner to
receive an interest that was worth less than the value
of the property transferred. The court allowed both an
8% minority discount and a 25% marketability discount.
In the similar case of Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.C.
No. 36 (2000), a combined 15% discount was allowed.
o FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY: Trustee not liable for
excessive distributions made at beneficiaries request.
The life beneficiary and the sole surviving contingent
beneficiary demanded and received distributions from
two trusts created by the life beneficiary far in excess of
those allowed by the terms of the trusts. After the life
beneficiary's death, the contingent beneficiary sued the
trustee for breach of trust. In Buchbinder v. Bank of
America, 30 S.W.3d 707 (Ark. 2000), the court held that
the remaining beneficiary had no cause of action, hav-
ing procured the very distributions about which the
beneficiary was complaining.
* FORMALITIES: Constructive trust not available to
remedy faulty will execution. A testatrix acknowledged
her will but neglected to sign it. The witnesses and the
notary signed the instrument. Without the testatrix's sig-
nature, the will cannot be probated, nor can a construc-
tive trust be imposed in favor of the beneficiaries because
that would validate an invalid will. Dalk v. Allen, 774 So.
2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
* GIFT TAX: Speculative liabilities do not reduce value
of gift. The court in Frank Armstrong, Jr., Trust v. United
States, No. CI.A.5:99CV00006, 2000 WL 1534714 (WD. Va.
2000), held that the value of a gift is not reduced by the
potential estate tax liability the donee could incur if the
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donor died within three years of the gift or by the donee's
agreement to pay additional tax on any increases in
value determined by the IRS. These amounts were
too speculative at the time of the transfer to permit a
valuation discount.
* INTERFERENCE WITH EXPECTANCY: Tort of inter-
ference with expectancy recognized. Over two strong
dissents, the Alabama Supreme Court recognized
a right to recover for tortious interference with an ex-
pectancy The plaintiffs alleged that the decedent's
husband prevented her from executing her will. Ex
parte Batchelor, No. 1991507, 2001 WL 10891 (Ala. 2001).
o JURISDICTION: Federal court has jurisdiction regard-
ing certain probate-related matters. Federal courts lack
jurisdiction to probate wills and administer estates. In
Dulce v. Dulce, 233 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2000), however, the
court held that a federal district court has jurisdiction to
order the executor to file a will for probate and to deter-
mine that a creditor is entitled to share in the estate.
* LAPSE: Reformation to conform to the testator's
alleged intent denied. A man's will left his residuary
estate to his wife but did not provide for a contingent gift
should she predecease him, which she did. Her sisters
petitioned for reformation of the will to conform to the
husband's alleged intent to leave his property to them
should his wife die first. The court in Flannery v. McNa-
mara, 738 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 2000), held that a will cannot
be reformed under such circumstances, rejecting the
contrary statement in Restatement (Third) of Property
(Donative Transfers) § 12.1.
* LIFE INSURANCE: Constitutionality of statute revok-
ing designation of ex-spouse as beneficiary. In Means
v. Scharbach, 12 R3d 1048 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), a Wash-
ington court upheld the constitutionality of the state's
revocation on divorce statute as applied to insurance
beneficiary designations in existence on the date of
enactment. The Colorado courts are divided on this
issue. In re Estate of Becker, No. 99CA2251, 2000 WL
1785278 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (constitutional) and In re
DeWitt, No. 99CA1349, 2000 WL 1785182 (Colo. Ct. App.
2000) (unconstitutional).
- POWER OF ATTORNEY: Gifts by agent not recog-
nized. In Christensen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2000-368, the court did not recognize gifts made under
a durable power of attorney because the power did not
expressly authorize the gifts. Accordingly, the gifts were
included in the donor' s gross estate.
o PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: Lawyer not liable
to individuals not named in any estate planning
document. The decedent's nieces and nephews sued
his lawyer alleging that the lawyer was negligent in not
preparing a new will according to their uncle's instruc-
tions, under which they would have been beneficiaries.
The court in Beauchamp v. Kemmeter, No. 00-0470, 2000
WL 1863576 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2000), held that a lawyer has
no duty to individuals who claim to be intended benefi-
ciaries based only on extrinsic evidence.
9 PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: Lawyers for ad-
ministrator owe no duty to heir. The father of an intestate
decedent alleged that he did not receive his share of the
estate and sued the lawyers who represented the admin-
istrator. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that
lawyers for a personal representative owe their duties
only to the client and not to the heirs or beneficiaries of
the estate. Jackson v. Furey, No. 98014796S, 2000 WL
1918052 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000).
* SHAM TRUSTS: Court disregards sham trusts for tax
purposes. Settlors transferred the vast majority of their
assets and right to income to a series of trusts. The sett-
lors were the sole trustees and sole beneficiaries of these
trusts. The trusts then paid their basic living expenses,
such as housing and health care. The court in Muhich v.
Commissioner, 238 F. 3d 860 (7th Cir. 2001), disregarded
these trusts for income tax purposes.
e CHARITABLE REMAINDER UNITRUSTS: Settlors per-
mitted to withdraw prohibited contribution. The transac-
tion did not disqualify the CRUT despite the impermissible
contribution. The settlors did, however, pay the tax on the
sale and did not take a deduction for the contribution.
PLR 200052026.
o ELECTING SMALL BUSINESS TRUSTS: Proposed
and temporary regulations issued regarding grantor
trusts selecting ESBT status under S corporation rules.
T.D. 8915.
- GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX: Final
regulations provide guidance on the type of trust
modifications that will not affect the exempt status
of a trust. T.D. 8912.
* QUALIFIED REVOCABLE TRUSTS: Proposed regula-
tions provide guidance for making a QRT election
under Code § 645, the tax treatment of the trust and
estate while the election is in effect and rules regard-
ing the termination of the election. Treas. Reg.
§ 10.6542-98.
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* VULTURE OR GHOUL TRUSTS: Final regulations
address the abusive use of charitable remainder and
charitable lead trusts. To obtain a large charitable de-
duction, a settlor could create a trust in which a charity
receives payments until the death of a young person. The
young person, however, would be terminally ill so that the
charity would actually receive far less than the valuation
rules anticipate. The new regulations restrict measuring
lives to prevent this and related abuses. T.D. 8926 (charita-
ble remainder trusts); T.D. 8923 (charitable lead trusts).
* Advance directives. Karen L. Schultz & Timothy D.
Schultz review the use of the four types of advance direc-
tives authorized by Texas law in Advance Directives: A
Primer, 63 Tex. B.J. 1034 (2000).
* Disclaimers. Jeff Y Bae & David M. Maloney discuss
requirements for disclaiming property interests in joint
tenancies in Disclaimers: The Last Line of Defense When
Wrestling with Estate Planning Problems, Tr. & Est. 40
(Nov. 2000).
* Estate tax. Is Treasury Regulation Sec. 25.2702-3(e),
Example 5 Valid?, Tr. & Est. 58 (Nov. 2000), offers Christo-
pher P. Bray's analysis of one of the federal estate and
gift tax system's most challenging provisions.
9 Family businesses. In Are Estate Taxes Sounding the
Death-Knell for High-Value Family-Owned Businesses?
An Examination of the Jack Kent Cooke Estate and the
Forced Sale of the Washington Redskins Football, 2000
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 303, David S. Gasperow discusses
avoiding estate taxes.
a Family limited partnerships. Marva J. Rowan explores
The Availability of Lack of Liquidity Discounts for Transfers
of Family Limited Partnership Interests: Kerr v. Commis-
sioner, 53 Tax Law. 959 (2000).
* Fiduciaries. John C. Novograd et al. offer tips for the
practitioner in Private Settlements of Fiduciary Accounts: A
Prescription for Achieving Finality, Tr. & Est. 28 (Nov. 2000).
o Inter vivos trusts. Dennis M. Patrick explores the recent
hype and applauds its demise in Living Trusts: Snake
Oil or Better Than Sliced Bread?, 27 Win. Mitchell L. Rev.
1083 (2000).
o Life insurance. J. Richard Duke explains Planning for
High Net-Worth U.S. Persons Through the Use of Offshore
Life Insurance, 1 Richmond J. Global L. Bus. 43 (2000).
* Power of attorney. Robert McLeod explores agents'
fiduciary duties in What Are the Limitations to an
Attorney-In-Fact's Power to Gift and to Change a Dis-
positive (Estate) Plan?, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1143 (2000).
o Rule Against Perpetuities. Keith L. Butler argues that
even reform does not help an otherwise extant legal rule
in Long Live the Dead Hand: A Case for Repeal of the
Rule Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 Wash. L. Rev.
1237 (2000). For a historical overview and a discussion of
the recent changes, read John G. Shively's The Death
of the Life in Being-The Required Federal Response to
State Abolition of The Rule Against Perpetuities, 78 Wash.
U. L. Q. 371 (2000).
o Spendthrift trusts. Karen E. Boxx discusses whether
spendthrift trusts have a place in the common law system
in Gray's Ghost-A Conversation About the Onshore
Trust, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1195 (2000).
o Will contests. Dennis W Collins discusses the warning
signs and the lawyer's role in proper planning in Avoiding
a Will Contest-The Impossible Dream?, 2000 Creighton L.
Rev. 7.
* Hawaii enacts Uniform Disclaimers of Property Inter-
ests Act. 2000 Haw. Sess. Laws 43.
* Kansas provides a statutory order of individuals with
authority to determine final disposition of a decedent's
remains. 2000 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 122.
* Massachusetts protects beneficiaries of structured
settlements. 2000 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 427.
* Ohio requires certain statements in living wills and
durable powers of attorney for health care to be in con-
spicuous type or capital letters. 2000 Ohio Laws 270.
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